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Symposium: Why the US Needs to Help Ukraine Defeat Russia

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Caption
A destroyed Russian tank sits in a snow covered wheat field in Kharkiv region amid Russia's military invasion on Ukraine on February 22, 2023. (Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images)

 

The following symposium is based on updated policy memos previously published by 华体会.

The Top Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

By Luke Coffey

Since Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years, Russian troops have ravaged Ukraine鈥檚 cities, raped its women, and stolen its children. Russian missiles and Iranian drones strike Ukrainian cities daily, often hitting civilian targets. Russia is the aggressor. Ukraine is the victim. 

For Americans who believe in respect for national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine is natural. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for are the material resources that give them a fighting chance. Meanwhile, Russia is America鈥檚 top geopolitical adversary. 

As Congress debates additional support for Ukraine, it is critical to separate myth from fact, including on these four topics:

Myth: Washington is writing Kyiv 鈥渂lank checks鈥� that Americans cannot afford. 

Reality: Every dollar spent in support of Ukraine is authorized by Congress and used for a specific purpose. There has never been a 鈥渂lank check鈥� to Ukraine. As of September 2023, the US has provided Ukraine with , or about 0.43 percent of America鈥檚 GDP. Since February 2022, this averages out to 68 cents per day for each American adult. The vast majority of this money never leaves the US and instead supports American jobs. For this modest amount, the US helps Ukraine dismantle Russia鈥檚 military without a single American firing a shot or being shot at. The US can easily afford to support Ukraine, but it cannot afford not to.

Myth: There is not enough oversight of US aid to Ukraine. 

Reality: There has likely never been more accountability in place for US foreign assistance than what is available for Ukraine aid. Soon after Russia鈥檚 invasion, the US government  the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group. More than 160 officials across 20 federal oversight agencies . To date, Congress has allocated for the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID to increase oversight through the working group. Dozens of  have been completed with dozens more in the works. According to the , 鈥淚nvestigations related to the Ukraine response have not yet substantiated significant waste, fraud, or abuse.鈥�

Myth: America is exponentially the largest donor to Ukraine. 

Reality: According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy鈥檚 Ukraine aid tracker, total European commitments are now more than double those of the US. After totaling all aid (military, economic, humanitarian, and refugee), 20 European countries  than the US as a percentage of GDP. Europe can do more, but that is no reason for the US to stop supporting Ukraine. 

Myth: Russia is a distraction. The US must focus on China. 

Reality: Russia is China鈥檚 junior partner. A defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching Western support for Kyiv, so a victorious Ukraine would strengthen Taiwan and deter China. It鈥檚 no coincidence that Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida  while Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Russia. During this visit, Xi , 鈥淣ow there are changes that haven鈥檛 happened in 100 years. When we are together, we drive these changes.鈥� The choice between security in Europe and security in the Indo-Pacific is a false dichotomy. In terms of US national interests, these two regions are intimately linked. In the  of Kishida, 鈥淭he security of the Indo-Pacific region cannot be separated from European security.鈥�

Why a Ukrainian Victory Matters to Americans

By Peter Rough and Luke Coffey

Ukraine aid is a good investment for the US. The United States has given Ukraine $43.7 billion in military assistance since Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion last year. This is about 5 percent of America鈥檚 fiscal year 2023 defense budget, or less than two-tenths of 1 percent of its gross domestic product. 

  • Ukraine is degrading one of America鈥檚 two major adversaries. Ukraine has  more than 11,350 pieces of Russian military equipment, including 2,164 main battle tanks, 2,566 infantry fighting vehicles, more than 500 pieces of towed artillery and multiple rocket launchers, 84 aircraft, 99 helicopters, and 12 naval ships鈥攁ll without shedding a single drop of US blood.
  • President Zelensky: 鈥淯kraine never  American soldiers to fight on our land instead of us.鈥�

Ukraine matters to the US economy. In 2021, Europe  for $3.19 trillion of foreign capital investment in the US (out of a total of $4.98 trillion). In 2022, 45 out of 50 states鈥攊ncluding the largest single-state economy, California鈥� more goods to Europe than to China. 

  • Ukraine shapes global commodities markets. Ukraine  in the top ten in the production of corn, wheat, barley, sunflower, sunflower oil, sunflower meal, and canola. It  117 of the 120 most widely used minerals and metals in the world, including titanium, iron, lithium, coal, and other energy deposits. At present, Russia occupies Ukrainian territory containing at least $12.4 trillion worth of raw materials. 

Weakening Russia hurts China. China sees Russia as its stalking horse. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin signed a 鈥渘o-limits partnership鈥� 20 days before Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and have met 40 times as heads of state. Xi  that Putin is his 鈥渂est, most intimate friend.鈥� 

  • Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida: 鈥淭he security of the Indo-Pacific region cannot be  from European security.鈥� 
  • Taiwanese Representative to the US Bi-khim Hsiao: 鈥淚 think  is the key message that will help to deter any consideration or miscalculation that an invasion can be conducted unpunished, without costs, in a rapid way. . . . That is why Ukraine鈥檚 success in defending against aggression is so important also for Taiwan.鈥� 
  • Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: 鈥淐丑颈苍补&苍产蝉辫; Putin to win. The best way to deter the [Chinese Communist Party] is to help Ukraine defeat Russia.鈥�
  • Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR): 鈥淪topping Russia also will allow the US to  on the greater threat from China. A Russian victory would force us to divert more resources for a longer time to Europe to deter Russian expansionism, creating persistent threats on both fronts. But a Ukrainian victory and a durable peace will secure our European flank as we confront China.鈥�

Ukraine aid strengthens America鈥檚 defense industrial base. US military assistance to Ukraine consists of over 40 presidential 鈥渄rawdowns鈥� from existing US stocks of weapons and materiel. Of the $43.7 billion appropriated for Ukraine since Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion,  $26 billion is dedicated to replenishing US stocks.

  • This year, $215.6 million of Ukraine aid went toward an  of Aerojet Rocketdyne鈥檚 complex rocket propulsion systems manufacturing capacity in Huntsville, AL, Camden, AR, and Orange County, VA.
  • Last year, the US appropriated $678 million to  government-owned, contractor-operated ammunition plants in Scranton, PA, Middletown, IA, and Kingsport, TN.

US economic support keeps Ukraine in the fight. Russia has destroyed approximately 45 percent of Ukraine鈥檚 economy. Absent economic support, Ukrainian society will collapse even if its military succeeds on the battlefield. The US has  $23 billion in economic support to date.

Ukraine aid undergoes more extensive scrutiny than any assistance program in US history. Last year, Congress appropriated $41 million to Ukraine oversight alone. More than 160 staffers in 20 federal organizations track US assistance to Ukraine, and their investigations have   significant waste, fraud, or abuse.

When the US leads, Europe follows. Although some countries like Germany and France could do more, much of Europe is stepping up. The US now ranks twelfth in  for Ukraine as a percentage of GDP, behind the United Kingdom, Poland, the Scandinavian and Baltic states, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Europe follows America鈥檚 example. 

Supporting Ukraine puts America first. Former President Donald Trump鈥檚 top national security advisors agree that supporting Ukraine is in the national interest of the United States.

  • Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: 鈥淭he least costly way to move forward is to  the Ukrainians with what they need now, provide them with the tools and resources that they need today. . . . An extended conflict, a conflict that results in Vladimir Putin in control of Kyiv or moving on to Europe will be far more costly . . . than providing them these weapons quickly, effectively training them and ending this.鈥� 
  • Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: 鈥淎ny outcome that plausibly constitutes a victory for Russia would be catastrophic for American security. A Russian victory would raise the chances of expanded war in Europe, with Putin contemplating the seizure of more lost elements of the Russian empire, whether in whatever is left of Ukraine or beyond. It would be taken as proof by the Chinese Communists eyeing Taiwan that America is unserious, making a war in the Pacific more likely.鈥�
  • Former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster: 鈥淯kraine is  a just war and the Ukrainian people need our sustained assistance.鈥�

Empowering Ukraine Prepares Us for China

By Rebeccah Heinrichs

China is America鈥檚 number one adversary due to Beijing鈥檚 willingness and capability to undermine US security, freedom, and prosperity. One pressing way China could strike a blow against US interests would be to violently force Taiwan to unify with mainland China. Doing so would immediately cause a global recession and rupture the US alliance architecture in the Pacific. It would also clear the way for China to contest US interests in the global commons far beyond the region. Some policymakers who are rightly concerned about the threat China poses to Taiwan argue that the United States should stop aiding Ukraine and instead divert attention, support, and weapons to Taiwan. While proponents of this argument are right to convey a sense of urgency and focus on some points that are true, their position overlooks key facts that make its simplistic zero-sum formulation unrealistic and self-defeating. For example, their argument does not sufficiently grapple with the connection between the  to US interests and allies, the responses of allies and how their perspectives affect outcomes, and the way the US budgetary and weapons delivery systems function.

China and Russia Threats to Key US Interests 

China and Russia have chosen to collaborate to undermine the United States and its allies and interests, even though for decades US administrations sought a 鈥淩ussia reset.鈥� Chinese leader Xi Jinping has reiterated his  for Russian leader Vladimir Putin multiple times in recent years, including before and after Russia鈥檚 full-scale and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. China would gain from a Russian victory in Ukraine鈥攁s defined by Russian gains of Ukrainian territory that would allow Moscow to conduct gray-zone operations against NATO nations along the new front, including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania. 

The United States and Europe  over $1.5 trillion in trade annually, making the transatlantic economy the largest in the world. So America will still have an interest in making certain that Europe remains stable and that ports and trade routes stay open, accessible, and safe. As Hudson scholars Peter Rough and Luke Coffey write

Some of America's oldest (France), closest (United Kingdom), and most reliable allies (central and eastern Europeans) are in Europe. The North American and European continents are also closely linked economically. These two landmasses account for approximately 45 percent of the global economy. Last year, the US and Europe were each other鈥檚 largest export markets. Forty-eight of the 50 states鈥攊ncluding the Pacific Ocean states of California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and Hawaii鈥攅xported more to Europe than to China. Year after year, the US and Europe are also each other鈥檚 top source of foreign direct investment. Europe鈥檚 security and stability, which Russia now threatens, bring untold benefits to the US economy and, by extension, the American worker.

Moreover, the United States will need to remain committed to ensuring the safety and security of the NATO alliance, and a Russian victory over Ukraine would put NATO nations at great peril. 

A victorious Ukraine, along with a strengthened eastern front of NATO, would provide a bulwark against further Russian aggression. A confident and stable NATO would present nations near the Russian border with more realistic opportunities to assist the United States in across-the-government efforts to weaken, compete with, and sometimes confront China. If Russia were to prevail, China would have greater leverage over Europe and would be the biggest benefactor of Russia鈥檚 success.

More than one year into the unprovoked full-scale Russian invasion, support from the US and its allies has allowed Ukraine to devastate the Russian military. According to reports, Ukraine has  more than half of Russia鈥檚 armored vehicles, exacted  including significant portions of its most knowledgeable officer and noncommissioned officer corps, and  Russia鈥檚 special (spetsnaz) forces. The Ukrainian successes have been so great that a bipartisan coalition of elected officials鈥攊ncluding Senators Tom Cotton (R-AR), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Roger Wicker (R-MS), and Angus King (I-ME)鈥攕ent a  to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin urging him to implement an update of the Department of Defense鈥檚 warfighting requirements for confronting Russia in Europe.

Responses of Allies and Their Important Perspectives 

The United States is the most powerful nation supporting Ukraine鈥檚 defense, but it is neither alone nor the only source of support. The United States continues to be a coalescing force, meaning its support and commitment encourage other nations in Europe to provide more support in ways that benefit the United States and the entire NATO alliance. US engagement has led to or assisted in increasing support for Ukraine and bolstering deterrence measures for NATO members on the eastern front. For example, Poland is increasing its defense spending to 4 percent of gross domestic product while simultaneously  NATO allies to boost their defense spending to 3 percent of GDP. Senior Polish officials continue to publicly nudge the largest economy in Europe, Germany, to send more weapons and ammunition to Ukraine.1 Estonia has  Ukraine with more than 1 percent of its GDP in military assistance. The nearly $396 million sent in aid is about half of Tallinn鈥檚 defense budget, making Estonia the most assertive supporter of Ukraine relative to its size. 

The United States and its European allies are not the only ones who believe that supporting Ukraine against Russia鈥檚 invading forces is prudent. Indo-Pacific allies have also aided Ukraine鈥檚 defense and vocally linked enabling a Ukrainian victory with ensuring Indo-Pacific security. Taiwan provided early humanitarian assistance, offered training programs to the Ukrainians, and in late 2022  another $56 million to help Ukraine finance rebuilding and recovery efforts. Moreover, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has frequently and publicly drawn parallels between Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and China鈥檚 increasingly bellicose threats to Taiwan鈥檚 sovereignty.

鈥淩ussia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call to us all, and served as a reminder that authoritarianism does not cease in its belligerence against democracy,鈥� the Taiwanese president  last month in New York.

When Vladimir Putin welcomed Xi Jinping for a three-day state visit to Moscow earlier this spring, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida made an unannounced trip to Ukraine. Kishida  Volodymyr Zelenskyy to virtually participate in the upcoming G7 summit in Hiroshima, pledged to supply Ukraine with $30 million worth of nonlethal equipment through a NATO fund, and released a joint statement demanding Russia withdraw all forces 鈥渋mmediately and unconditionally.鈥� 

Another American ally, South Korea, has aided Ukraine with $100 million in humanitarian assistance and recently reached an  to lend 500,000 rounds of 155mm artillery shells to the United States鈥攁llowing Washington greater flexibility to supply Ukraine with ammunition.

Not a single weapon the United States has delivered to Ukraine was scheduled or intended to go to Taiwan. To date, Taiwan has been supported through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), like other nations that buy weapons from the United States. The entirety of the FMS backlog existed before a shot was fired in Ukraine. Because Taiwan is currently not being invaded, weapons deliveries have moved at a peacetime pace and have run into various bureaucratic and diplomatic challenges in addition to supply chain bottlenecks. Taiwan has chosen to purchase certain types of US weapons, and the United States has worked with Taipei to choose the most appropriate weapons that would be most conducive to deterring a PRC invasion and then fending off that invading force if deterrence were to fail. Given the sensitivity of the US-Taiwan relationship, achieving progress through FMS has been exceedingly difficult.

In contrast, America is arming Ukraine with weapons through the presidential drawdown authority, which allows us to send weapons already in US stockpiles. The US has also used Ukraine Security Assistance funding and Foreign Military Funding to purchase new weapons for Ukraine as well.

The Venn diagram of weapons that are most useful to Ukraine and Taiwan is complex. Principally, Ukraine needs long-range fires against ground targets and a mechanized/armored maneuver capability. By contrast, Taiwan needs anti-ship cruise missiles, sea mines, and many of the dispersed infantry capabilities that were useful to Ukraine at the beginning of the war, but are less so today. Some capabilities, like air defense, are badly needed in both scenarios. 

However, where those high-demand weapon systems do compete for deliveries, they should go to Taiwan before any of the other nations in the FMS queue. For example, some Middle Eastern nations also have requested sales of the same weapons and are currently . 

Responding to political consensus in Washington and the demand signal from Taiwanese officials, there are encouraging signs that US defense companies are supporting creative ideas to ramp up production and weapons deliveries to Taiwan with a sense of urgency. Earlier this year, around 25 US defense companies sent representatives to Taiwan to discuss joint production of weapons like drones and . And in July, the United States announced its intent to deliver the first of a series of weapons packages to .

Still, the reality is there is a high demand for US weapons for allies and partners across multiple regions. The United States should seek to rebuild the defense industrial base so that it can produce the necessary weapons to meet the demand鈥攓uickly and at scale. Reestablishing the US defense manufacturing base will take years, but since Russia鈥檚 unprovoked war against Ukraine, there are encouraging indicators that the United States has sped up the production capacity of some of these key systems鈥攁nd would not have done so had it not been for US support for Ukraine. Some examples include the , , , and the Javelin. So while there may still be a delay in delivering key systems to Taiwan, that wait is likely shorter now due to the United States sending these systems to Ukraine. 

Washington is also providing Ukraine with other support, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), but the United States has plenty of capacity for both theaters. And the systems, experts, and operators involved in each theater are different.

What to Do

Below are five ways the US government can continue arming Ukraine while bolstering Taiwan鈥檚 defense. 

1. Reform the law to speed up Taiwan鈥檚 weapons. There is great bipartisan consensus that Taiwan is under enormous pressure from China and should receive those requested weapons immediately. In other words, this is a political decision that requires elected officials to change the system, and officials who are concerned about the speed of weapons delivery to Taiwan should join the officials already working to fix this. Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee Michael McCaul (R-TX) has  that he will do all he can to lead legislative changes and pressure the White House to deliver weapons to Taiwan as rapidly as it delivers them to Ukraine. Similarly, Chairman of the House Select Committee on China Mike Gallagher (R-WI) has  for the Biden administration to speed up the delivery of Harpoon missiles to Taiwan by rejiggering systems that already exist in the US stockpile to better suit the Taiwanese terrain. This effort would be similar to emergency measures taken to accelerate the delivery of weapons to Ukraine last year. 

2. Provide Ukraine with the weapons and operational leeway to succeed in a sustained counteroffensive that enables Ukraine to prevail. Rather than continuing down the Biden administration鈥檚 risk-averse approach that slowly provides certain weapons, the United States should equip Ukraine to sustain a punishing counteroffensive to regain its territory and convince Moscow it should withdraw. Washington should provide Ukraine with  that are not spoken for and that the United States has plenty of鈥攍ike the dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICMs). Additionally, the United States should  Ukraine with available unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the MQ-9s, which would boost Ukraine's ISR abilities to locate targets and provide coordinates for long-range precision fires. The president should also permit Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to take out Russian forces and logistics that are helping the invasion wherever they are located鈥攊ncluding inside the Russian border. The Biden administration鈥檚 current strategy of forbidding Ukraine to do so provides Russians a sanctuary.

3. Prioritize US foreign policy objectives. The United States should be laser-focused on the most pressing threats and should not fall for the delusion that it can do all things everywhere, without limit and at a peacetime pace. While the United States would be wise to always keep an open hand to diplomatic opportunities, the United States should not withhold deployments of military capabilities to the Asia theater for fear of 鈥減rovoking鈥� China and foreclosing opportunities on other aims, such as on climate policy or new terms on trade. Nor should the United States withhold critical and timely deliveries of weapons to Taiwan for fear of possible retaliation by China. 

4. Fund the unfunded priorities list for US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). The $3.5 billion in total unfunded priorities is significant, and Congress should authorize and appropriate those funds鈥攂ut not at the expense of the layered air defenses and munitions the United States is sending to Ukraine. The consequences of ending support to Ukraine would certainly overwhelm the relatively small financial gain from halting military aid to Ukraine. 

5. Rebuild the defense industrial base.We are in a new cold war against adversaries that are making a determined effort to undermine, weaken, impoverish, and humiliate the United States. After decades of bipartisan folly in foreign and military policy, America lacks a modern defense industrial base, has a Navy that is too small, and does not have enough shipyards. The challenges are great, but rather than take a defeatist and pessimistic view of the situation, the United States should make a clear-eyed and realistic assessment of the regional theaters that are integral to US security and prosperity, and then knuckle down and get to work.

Conclusion

Ending support for Ukraine鈥檚 defense would neither propel the United States to a swift pivot to the Pacific nor speed up weapons deliveries to Taiwan. But it would bolster Russia鈥檚 ability to subjugate Ukraine, further weaken NATO鈥檚 position against Russia, and possibly result in the direct invasion of NATO allies. A Russian success against Ukraine would be valuable to China and would further cement PRC power and leverage over Europe. It is not unreasonable to surmise that suddenly ending US support to Ukraine would also severely damage America鈥檚 alliance relationships in Europe and Asia, as many countries have spent significant treasure and political risk to support Ukraine鈥檚 success. Lastly, such an abandonment would communicate a lack of US resolve to stand firm against authoritarian imperialism鈥攁 message that would certainly be received with gladness in Beijing.