Fresh off a 华体会 field tour in Ukraine, Senior Fellow Can Kasapo臒lu offers a military situation report about the war there, focusing this week on Ukraine鈥檚 unconventional military options.
A previous 华体会 policy memo analyzed the Ukrainian Armed Forces鈥� military courses of action for disabling the Kerch Bridge in occupied Crimea. This special edition presents an open-source defense intelligence analysis of three additional options, as well as a current battlefield assessment in the final section.
The Military Necessity of Exploring Ukraine鈥檚 Unconventional Options
A week on the ground in Ukraine made one aspect of the current war abundantly clear: the incumbent situation is not a stalemate. Assessing it as one could lead to catastrophic consequences for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and for Europe鈥檚 defense architecture.
There is no doubt that Russia holds many advantages and that the situation on the ground remains dangerous for Ukraine. Indeed, the battlefield geometry is largely static, while Russia holds the upper hand in force generation and artillery. Moreover, while the Russian military鈥檚 engineering units have prepared a deep and multi-layered defensive complex, Ukraine lacks similar structures that can when the situation worsens.
Furthermore, the Kremlin can continue to conscript and further mobilize from a large manpower pool of millions of personnel, while Ukraine could not even finalize its recent mobilization draft. Worse, Russia鈥檚 partners in crime, North Korea and Iran, have boosted the Russian military鈥檚 warfighting prowess with systematic arms transfers. Cumulatively, these factors have led to sharp differences in the force-on-force and force-to-terrain capabilities of the belligerents, favoring Moscow in the long run.
But this war is not the sprint that the Kremlin envisioned it would be鈥攊t is a marathon. While Russia may possess the stamina for a long-running conflict, Ukraine has demonstrated increasing skill in employing unconventional military options to combat Russia鈥檚 many advantages.
This special edition, while neither an intelligence forecast nor a set of specific defense policy recommendations, examines three such options. Each of them holds the potential to help Kyiv gain ground in this marathon conflict.
Option 1: Targeting the Joint Russia-Iran Drone Plant and Other Military-Industrial Facilities inside Russia
Targeting the joint Russia-Iran drone plant deep inside Russian territory would carry both military and political weight for Ukraine. Such an attack would also resonate with Tehran, sending a strong message to the Islamic Republic and its formidable Revolutionary Guard Corps to reduce their roles in the conflict.
The threat posed by Iran-originated Shahed loitering munitions, now produced in Russia under the Geran family, is growing. Recently, Russia has increased its use of these drone warfare assets, and Russian combat formations are now able to unleash scores of the weapons each week.
Moreover, new variants of the Shahed line have become increasingly effective. As a recent edition of this Hudson newsletter detailed, a large number of new Shaheds, including the jet-powered Shahed-238 variant, have become operational. Other platforms of the baseline feature warheads equipped with tungsten balls, shrapnel, or thermobaric warheads. A new class of the family possesses special coatings that decrease the drones鈥� radar signatures. Drone wreckage has even shown that some Shaheds carry Kyivstar SIM cards and modems that allow them to map out Ukrainian air defenses in advance of follow-on attacks.
There is no underestimating the magnitude of the threat that Shahed munitions pose for Kyiv. The drones are causing three specific problems for Ukraine.
First, they are depleting the nation鈥檚 already scarce air defense resources. By triggering sirens in an area of attack, even a fully intercepted wave can paralyze operations in critical facilities like the Port of Odesa. Second, Shahed salvos divert Ukraine鈥檚 maneuver short-range air defense (M-SHORAD) assets, such as its 35mm-class Flakpanzer Gepard anti-aircraft guns, to protect population centers. These assets are better utilized fulfilling their designed function, which is accompanying heavy armor and mechanized formations to protect them from air threats. Third, Shahed drones are being employed in mixed strike packages alongside missiles, further complicating the picture for Ukraine鈥檚 air defenses.
Recent media posts that the new drone plant in Tatarstan, operated jointly by Russia and Iran, is the likely source of many of the Russian military鈥檚 Shahed loitering munitions. As such, the factory offers a legitimate target for Ukrainian strikes. Unchecked, the plant will continue to produce thousands of Shahed variants, . To ensure its national security, Kyiv needs to put constant pressure on the facility, if not eliminate it altogether.
Open-source intelligence suggests that the plant is located in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, in Russia鈥檚 special economic zone. To strike it, Ukraine would have to hit a facility some 900 miles from its border, while Ukraine鈥檚 longest-range drone, the UJ-26 Beaver, only has an approximate range of 620 miles. suggests that the UJ-26 carries a relatively small, 44-pound warhead, so reducing its combat payload is not a viable option.
Instead, Ukraine will have to boost the range of the kamikaze drone without making the warhead smaller, should it opt for launching the UJ-26 into Tatarstan. Since a small number of drones would likely fail to seriously damage the Yelabuga factory, which is almost certainly protected by dense air defenses, a large salvo would also be necessary
Another option for Ukraine would be to launch a Shahed drone strike of its own against the plant. Interestingly, in late 2023, the chief executive officer of the Ukrainian defense industry company Ukroboronprom, Herman Smetanin, stated that Kyiv has been pursuing . A typical Shahed-136 has a range of roughly 1,600 miles and delivers a warhead weighing between 80 and 100 pounds. While Ukraine has not yet produced a drone with a range exceeding 620 miles, its defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) is likely capable of long-range Shahed loitering munitions to target the drone plant in Tatarstan.
While striking that factory would carry significant symbolic value, conducting a systematic long-range campaign against other Russian defense industrial facilities would also hurt the Kremlin. Ukraine鈥檚 recent strike against Russia鈥檚 Taganrog Aviation Plant, which hosted A-50 Beriev airborne early warning and control (EW&C) aircraft, is of this type of campaign, as is Ukraine鈥檚 January 2024 attack on the defense Tula, a facility that manufactures the Pantsir short-to-medium range air defense system.
Ukraine could also use its growing arsenal of Neptune anti-ship missiles, which recently gained a land-attack capability and extended range, in a mixed strike package alongside loitering munitions. Moreover, a large transfer of Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), ideally including the unitary warhead variant, could help the Ukrainians get the job done. Neptune missiles and the ATACMS could easily reach many defense industrial plants located near Ukraine.
Option 2: Temporarily Seizing Russian Territory
While the Russian military is formidable, the Soviet-remnant siloviki elite鈥檚 adventurist military dreams have made it vulnerable to internal threats. During the June 2023 armed mutiny by the Wagner Private Military Company, for example, the shadow army seized control of Rostov-on-Don, and the Southern Military District headquarters within the city, in a matter of hours. The group then moved north, stopping just short of Moscow.
In 2023, anti-Kremlin Russian paramilitary groups, dubbed the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, , sparking there. Evidence suggests that these paramilitary raids were coordinated with Ukraine鈥檚 ). The GUR鈥檚 widely known chief, General Kyrylo Budanov, has already expressed his interest in .
This week, another raiding party composed of Ukraine-supported, anti-Kremlin Russian groups hit Belgorod and Kursk, making incursions . The attackers hit the state administration building in , while and Telegram that Tochka-U tactical ballistic missiles and Vampire were also used in the operation. Reportedly, the attack , a pro-Ukraine paramilitary group manned by Buryat and Yakut fighters. According to news outlets, the raid employed artillery and armor, showcasing sophisticated planning.
The March 2024 Kursk and Belgorod attacks, following in the footsteps of the 2023 armed incursions into Russia, were at best probing efforts. Nonetheless, they provided Ukraine with a template for dispatching surprise forays at larger scale, potentially using additional fire-support elements to temporarily seize and control terrain.
Such a military strategy would heighten the domestic threats to the Kremlin, worsening the security perceptions sparked by Wagner鈥檚 thwarted uprising. In addition to the armed Russian and Belarusian opposition, Ukraine can employ other battle-hardened groups more effectively, such as the Georgian Legion, which excels at fire-support operations in mobile detachments, as well as several Chechen battalions that would gladly take part in the raids.
Option 3: A Ukrainian Military Campaign in Transnistria
The Russian military has a 1,500-strong forward presence in the breakaway Transnistria region of Moldova. While Russia鈥檚 Ministry of Defense claims that the Kremlin has fielded battalion there, writings suggest a larger deployment has occurred. Moreover, the area hosts a large military storage facility for the Kremlin, the Cobasna ammunition depot.
From a geostrategic standpoint, the Ukrainian military enjoys the upper hand in any offensive initiative against the Russian contingent in Transnistria. Since the region is surrounded by Moldova and Ukraine, the Kremlin cannot reinforce its forward-deployed troops there. Moreover, the bulk of the military personnel in the area are conscripted from the local pro-Russian population.
Targeting and expelling the Russian presence in Transnistria would score important political and military points for Kyiv. Above all, Russia鈥檚 expansionist presence in the area poses a threat to the Ukrainian city of Odesa. Before the current war, the Kremlin had assembled a large amphibious force of assets from Kaliningrad, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Eastern Military District, possibly to seize Odesa. Had the Russian military managed to conduct such an ambitious operation鈥攚hich was stymied by the Ukrainian coastal defenses鈥� sinking of the Black Sea Fleet鈥檚 flagship Moskva in April 2022 and the deterrence signal it sent鈥擱ussia could have attempted to link Odesa to its forces in Transnistria.
Seizing Russian-held territory would equip Ukraine, which has long been on the defensive, with leverage in escalation dominance against the Kremlin. Of course, such a bold move would come with risks. A large-scale strike could trigger a humanitarian situation in Moldova and neighboring Romania. Shelling near the Cobasna military depot could prove very dangerous. But none of these risks are inevitable. Ukrainian troops conducting systemic incursions into Transnistria augmented by targeted drone strikes could force the Russian contingent in the breakaway province to abandon its positions. Since Ukraine, a victim of the unfolding invasion, would not run a war of conquest in sovereign Moldovan territory, such a military operation should be married to fast diplomatic talks with Chisinau, as well as a border security deal between the two nations.
With elections set for later this year in Moldova and European Union accession on the table, the nation鈥檚 intelligence services expect that to intense Russian hybrid warfare efforts in 2024. Proactively depriving Moscow of its leverage in Transnistria could help the country鈥檚 pro-Western president, Maia Sandu, set a geopolitical course forward.
Battlefield Update
Last week, the balance of power on the battlefield remained relatively unchanged. Russia remained on the offensive, expanding territorial control in the eastern and southern sectors. Ukraine remained largely on the defensive and continued its efforts to push back advancing Russian combat formations. The Ukrainian military鈥檚 localized counterattacks slowed down the Russian advance, though Kyiv鈥檚 recent choice to preserve its manpower and withdraw from Avdiivka illustrates that Ukraine鈥檚 political-military leadership is well of its recent setbacks.
According to recent reports, Russia currently controls approximately 18.5 percent of Ukrainian territory. While from 26.4 percent in the spring of 2022, the Russian push remains strong and menacing on multiple axes.
In the east, one of Russia鈥檚 main strategic priorities continued to be increasing its hold on Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts while Moscow maintained its positions in the south. Along the eastern front line, hotspots such as Kupiansk, Svatove, Bakhmut, Stepove, Avdiivka, and Mariinka witnessed heavy positional fighting over the last week. In the south, Russia pushed Ukrainian defenses, with a particular focus on Robotyne and Verbove. In Robotyne, numerous reports suggest that trenches, ongoing Ukrainian strikes, and (EW) efforts are slowing down Russian advances.
According to the United Kingdom鈥檚 Defense Intelligence, in an attempt to slow down Russia鈥檚 progress and perhaps a large-scale offensive in the future, Ukraine recently fortification of defensive positions. In addition, despite mounting pressure, Ukrainian combat formations continued to hold their positions along the bridgehead across the Dnipro River near Krynky. But holding the tactically important position is getting harder and costlier for Ukraine every day.
While the character of Russia鈥檚 aerial assaults did not change significantly this week, their intensity and frequency saw a substantial uptrend. As in past strikes, the recent attacks targeted civilian centers. In Odesa, where Russia intensified its efforts, five people were killed in a strike less than one-third of a mile from a between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. On March 10, Ukrainian forces neutralized Shahed drones that Russia launched from occupied Crimea and Krasnodar. These strikes also included several S-300 missiles modified for attack roles.
sources, on March 9, Russia struck a Ukrainian Patriot in Donetsk. While the destruction of the targeted launcher vehicles was confirmed by from the battlefield, attempts to identify the specific destroyed Ukrainian assets are pending further investigation.
Ukrainian forces persisted in their strikes against critical Russian platforms and facilities. They conducted an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack in Rostov Oblast of drones, allegedly engaging an A-50 . Russia uses this facility for the maintenance and repair of its rare aerial assets, including the A-50, making it a critical hub for the sustainability of Russian air power.
Ukrainian strikes also caused economic damage in Russia. According to , Russia鈥檚 oil refining capacity might have temporarily plunged due to the Ukrainian UAV strikes, leading to higher gasoline prices as Russia鈥檚 elections near.