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National Review

Aftermath of a Perfect Storm

john_fonte
john_fonte
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for American Common Culture

, by Mike Gonzalez (Crown Forum, 288 pp., $26)

In this new book, Mike Gonzalez tackles the debate among conservatives on Latino political assimilation. Gonzalez, who was born in Cuba, is a former deputy editorial-page editor of the Asian edition of the Wall Street Journal; he served in the George W. Bush administration and is currently a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation. The question he asks here is, How did Hispanics become overwhelmingly Democratic and what can conservatives do about it?

Gonzalez鈥檚 diagnosis of the problem and his historical analysis of the past 50 years of left-wing cultural aggression against our nation鈥檚 assimilationist ethos (and thus against Latino newcomers, as well as America鈥檚 civic heritage) are compelling. Nonetheless, his proposed solutions, while offering plenty of good ideas, ultimately fall short of what is necessary to sustain American conservatism.

Gonzalez begins with an overview of Latino groups (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Central Americans, and Dominicans) and examines how they differ. He then explains the bureaucratic creation of 鈥淗ispanics鈥� in the 1970s as a new racial and minority 鈥渧ictim鈥� group. All Americans with Spanish names, whether of Mexican, Spanish, Puerto Rican, Colombian, Dominican, or Chilean descent, became 鈥淗ispanics,鈥� designated as a 鈥減rotected class鈥� and eligible for 鈥渁ffirmative action.鈥� Under both LBJ and Nixon-Ford, Hispanics were categorized as part of a racially oppressed 鈥渂rown鈥� minority.

Gonzalez skillfully analyzes a series of big-government programs, cultural shifts, and ideological wars that combined to create a 鈥減erfect storm鈥� of social pathologies. The immigration legislation of 1965 emphasized family reunification and led to a large increase in immigration from Latin America. At the same time, LBJ鈥檚 Great Society expanded the welfare state and 鈥渃rowded out鈥� many of the mediating structures of civil society; the minority-rights revolution promoted ethnic-group preferences; and American schools advanced multiculturalism and bilingual education, weakening assimilation. Simultaneously (and very significantly), the sexual revolution undermined the bedrock institutions of marriage and family.

This 鈥減erfect storm,鈥� Gonzalez tells us, has had 鈥渄ire consequences鈥� for Hispanics. They include an increase in out-of-wedlock births, growing welfare dependency that hinders social mobility, and an education gap. Out-of-wedlock births among Latinos in 2013 rose to 53.4 percent, up from about 40 percent in the 1990s and increasing at a faster rate than for either whites or blacks. Census data reveal that 53 percent of Hispanics live in households that receive some form of government assistance and that Latinos are 鈥渙verrepresented鈥� in various federal welfare programs. Also, Gonzalez laments the 鈥渆ducation gap鈥� evident in the fact that almost 37 percent of all Hispanics 鈥渉ave not completed high school鈥� and that the Hispanic school-dropout rate is 鈥渕uch higher than for other groups.鈥�

All of these factors create huge barriers to successful Latino assimilation. Conservatives, Gonzalez says, 鈥渕ust offer policy solutions鈥� and eschew what he mischaracterizes as the 鈥渟cholarly grousing鈥� of civilization theorist Samuel Huntington. Gonzalez suggests a series of solid policy proposals, including support for school choice, ending the marriage tax penalty for low-income Americans, tripling the child credit for children younger than three, and strong opposition to multiculturalism, bilingual education, and ethnic-group preferences.

Gonzalez nonetheless puts his greatest emphasis on a 鈥渃ulture first鈥� strategy that emphasizes marriage and the family. Marriage is the highest priority, he writes, the 鈥渒ey to the continuation of the American experiment in freedom.鈥� His 鈥渕arriage agenda鈥� includes measures such as launching community-oriented campaigns promoting marriage. He insists that 鈥渆ventually the private sector will need to get involved in the effort to reverse the unmarriage culture in the Hispanic community.鈥�

No doubt strengthening marriage among Latinos would be good for families, the economy, the nation as a whole, and, yes, for conservative politics. But figuring out the way to reach Gonzalez鈥檚 grandiose goal has eluded some of our best minds. Marriage expert Kay Hymowitz of the Manhattan Institute, when asked how to combat family fragmentation, said, 鈥淭his is something I have been thinking about for over a decade now and I don鈥檛 have an answer鈥� (except, she noted, to push for a societal consensus that broken marriages are a problem). How could Gonzalez鈥檚 鈥渃ulture first鈥� approach 鈥渂reak the liberal monopoly on Hispanic Americans鈥� short of a full-scale cultural counterrevolution (and particularly a sexual counterrevolution)? How long would this take? What are its chances of success?

To be sure, Gonzalez is not politically na茂ve. He states: 鈥淚t is clear that Obama wants to use the support of Latinos to transform the country increasingly into a European-style social democracy.鈥� To achieve 鈥渢his transformation, the president and progressives鈥� offer 鈥減rotected status鈥� and the 鈥渞edistribution of wealth鈥� to Hispanics and others.

Nevertheless, despite the many solid arguments in the book, Gonzalez fumbles the most important issue, the proverbial 鈥渆lephant in the living room鈥�: the continuous mass low-skilled immigration that inevitably creates an electoral bloc much more open to the political arguments of the big-government Left than to those of the limited-government Right.

Gonzalez talks repeatedly about removing 鈥渂arriers鈥� to assimilation, but the largest barrier of all is the status quo of perpetual mass low-skilled immigration. He preemptively attempts to answer critics. Thus, Gonzalez admits that 鈥渢he collision between a massive immigrant flow and the unmarriage culture will be explosive.鈥� He quotes Robert Putnam to the effect that 鈥渕assive immigration鈥� puts 鈥渟trains on communities,鈥� but he counters that 鈥渢his is not a reason to . . . clamp down on immigration.鈥� He concedes that critics of mass immigration, including Heather Mac Donald, who have raised the alarm about the Latino illegitimacy rate, have a 鈥減owerful argument鈥� when contending that rapid immigration growth contributes to myriad social problems. But the answer, Gonzalez declares, is not to cut immigration but to take 鈥渢he issue of illegitimacy seriously and try to reverse it.鈥�

He writes that we have 鈥渙pened the country again to high immigration (from which I benefited and with which I have no problem).鈥� Like many conservative supporters of mass immigration, Gonzalez repeats the shopworn clich茅 that 鈥淎merica has absorbed many, many previous waves of immigrants鈥� and concludes that we can, therefore, do so again.

But as Gonzalez himself explains, American society in 2014 is very different from the culture of 1914. Yes, America did 鈥渁bsorb鈥� the great wave of Ellis Island immigration, but we did so because of rather heavy-handed 鈥淎mericanization鈥� policies (i.e., 鈥渢ough love鈥� assimilation) implemented by our elites, and, most important, because of the immigration-restriction legislation of 1924.

President Coolidge favored reducing immigration, stating that 鈥渘ew arrivals should be limited to our capacity to absorb them into the ranks of good citizenship.鈥� Coolidge signed the 1924 bill cutting immigration because he believed it would make it easier to Americanize the millions of immigrants who were already in America. My Sicilian-immigrant relatives opposed this legislation at the time, but Coolidge鈥檚 judgment that cutting legal immigration would facilitate the crucial goal of Americanization was sound.

Gonzalez repeats the arguments of the mass-immigration Right that the Bracero program (1942鈥�64) for Mexican agricultural workers reduced illegal immigration because it permitted low-wage workers to come to the U.S. legally. But Philip Martin, chairman of the Comparative Immigration & Integration Program at the University of California, Davis, has pointed out that 鈥渢his argument was proven wrong.鈥� Between 1942 and 1964, about 4.6 million braceros were admitted legally, and at the same time 4.9 million illegal immigrants were caught entering the U.S. Thus, illegal immigration increased during the Bracero program. Not surprisingly, however, the end of the Bracero program did result in higher wages for American workers.

Another chimera of the mass-immigration Right that Gonzalez endorses is the Krieble Foundation鈥檚 guest-worker plan. Under the Krieble plan, the importation of millions of low-skilled 鈥渢emporary guest workers鈥� from the developing world would be unlimited and subject only to the market鈥檚 demand for cheap labor. Private businesses would set up recruiting offices throughout the world and conduct background checks for potential 鈥済uest workers,鈥� who would be expected to eventually return home. Since the workers would be permitted to bring their families, they would inevitably have children who would be American citizens, so good luck on the 鈥渢emporary鈥� guests鈥� returning. The only certainty about this quixotic plan is that it would lower the wages of millions of American workers at the bottom end of the economic ladder, including, of course, blacks and Latinos.

Many tell us that Latinos and other immigrants are 鈥渘atural conservatives.鈥� But as the Pew Research Center reveals, they are much more likely than native-born citizens to support left-wing policies. Pew posed the question: Would you prefer a bigger government with higher taxes and more services or a smaller government with lower taxes and fewer services? Native-born citizens preferred smaller government by 48 percent to 41 percent. Latino immigrants favored bigger government, higher taxes by 81 percent to 12 percent. Hispanics overall preferred big government by 75 percent to 19 percent.

A 43-page booklet published by Phyllis Schlafly鈥檚 Eagle Forum titled 鈥淗ow Mass (Legal) Immigration Dooms a Conservative Republican Party鈥� examined the political attitudes of immigrants in detail and found that, on issue after issue鈥擮bamacare, affirmative action, gun control, even environmental regulation鈥攁ll immigrant groups (Latinos, Asians, Muslims) preferred positions championed by the Left to a much greater degree than did the general public. The obvious conclusion is that the status quo (mass legal low-skilled immigration) will, unless reversed, ultimately doom conservative politics and our limited constitutional government.

A realistic solution, therefore, to the existential issue of how to sustain a conservative regime in the future cannot (pace Mike Gonzalez) be dependent on the success of a pro-marriage cultural counterrevolution (although this would help), but must depend upon our success in emulating Coolidge and cutting mass legal immigration.