American readiness to offer aid has bred dependence, and the U.S. has ended up as an enabler of Pakistan鈥檚 dysfunction.
By inviting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the White House, President Obama may only have wanted to signal America鈥檚 continued interest in the nuclear-armed country. But in Pakistan it reignited the belief that Uncle Sam simply cannot manage the world without Pakistan鈥檚 help.
For years Pakistan鈥檚 policies have coincided with those of the U.S. only nominally. Pakistan鈥檚 support for the Taliban in Afghanistan is the main reason Mr. Obama had to reverse his decision of pulling out troops from that country. Pakistan鈥檚 development of battlefield nuclear weapons also runs contrary to U.S. plans for reducing nuclear proliferation. Diplomatic statements notwithstanding, the two sides have very different priorities.
Even after feting Pakistan鈥檚 democratically-elected leader, it is unlikely that Mr. Obama鈥檚 problems in Afghanistan or Pakistan will end anytime soon. Although he continues to retain popularity at home, according to recent polls, Mr. Sharif has little control over foreign policy. Pakistan鈥檚 powerful military, currently headed by General Raheel Sharif (no relation to the Prime Minister) persists with its obsessive competition with neighbouring India, which in turn shapes Pakistan鈥檚 worldview.
Lost opportunity
Mr. Obama lost the initiative on Afghanistan by relying on Pakistan鈥檚 ability to set up direct negotiations with the Taliban. He has spent the last seven years alternating between coaxing Pakistan鈥檚 leaders with economic and military assistance and delivering tough messages. The pretence of toughness has lacked credibility. Diplomacy and inducements have failed because they only reinforce the Pakistani view that the country鈥檚 geostrategic importance for the U.S. outweighs its resentment of negative Pakistani policies.
Pakistan has received $40 billion in U.S. military and economic aid since 1950, of which $23 billion were given after the 9/11 attacks to strengthen the country鈥檚 resolve in fighting terrorism. But Pakistan鈥檚 focus has always been its rivalry with India, against whom it has initiated (and lost) three wars, using U.S. equipment each time.
The recent Pakistani announcement about an 鈥業ndia-centric鈥� tactical nuclear programme indicates that despite serious threats to Pakistan鈥檚 security by Jihadi extremists, India 鈥� an American friend 鈥� remains the principal enemy in the eyes of Pakistan鈥檚 leaders.
Americans have several reasons to mistrust Pakistan, which also accuses the U.S. of being a fair weather friend. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons while promising Washington that it won鈥檛 go nuclear if it gets U.S. assistance. Pakistan鈥檚 ongoing support of jihadi terrorists is part of its effort to expand regional influence in competition with India, especially in Afghanistan and the disputed Kashmir region.
Over the last 13 years, many U.S. soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan by the Taliban and the Haqqani network 鈥� trained, armed and supported by Pakistan. The recent surge in Taliban activity, manifested most blatantly during the occupation of the Afghan city of Kunduz, is attributed by U.S. and Afghan officials to Pakistani support.
It seems that while officially Pakistan was helping the U.S. and Afghan officials in peace talks with the Taliban, its covert support was preparing the latter for reoccupying Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal. Increased willingness to fight Pakistani Taliban has not diminished Pakistan鈥檚 support for the Afghan Taliban. Groups that target India 鈥� such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and its other incarnation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) 鈥� are not even deemed terrorists by Pakistan鈥檚 establishment.
Conditions waived
In 2009, Congress made aid to Pakistan conditional to specific criteria. The administration was required to certify to Congress that Islamabad was meeting American terms in fighting terrorism and diminishing the military鈥檚 role in politics. But for several years, instead of certifying that Pakistan was doing what it was expected, the Secretary of State has invoked the right to waive the conditions on grounds that continuing aid to Pakistan was necessary for U.S. national security.
The Obama administration spent its first few years trying to convince Pakistan鈥檚 civil and military leaders of the virtues of changing their strategic calculus. In doing so, they praised Pakistan publicly and expressed optimism every time Pakistan took a positive step, however small.
Over the last two years, much optimism was expressed over Pakistan鈥檚 decision to militarily eliminate safe havens used by terrorists responsible for attacks inside Pakistan and against China. But now the administration appears to have woken up, once again, to the realisation that Pakistan鈥檚 decision to act against terrorists does not extend to all jihadi groups.
During a recent visit to Islamabad, National Security Adviser Susan Rice reminded Pakistan of its unfulfilled commitments about helping with the Afghan peace process. She also asked Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network, which has been involved in several attacks on American targets including one on the U.S. embassy in Kabul in 2011.
If things have not changed since 2011, one cannot help but question the administration鈥檚 intermittent hopefulness about a turnaround in Pakistani policies.
Pakistan is the sixth largest nation in the world by population but only 26th by size of GDP on PPP basis and 42nd in nominal GDP. It has the world鈥檚 sixth largest nuclear arsenal and eighth largest army but performs poorly in most non-military indices. It ranks 146 out of 187 countries in the world on the Human Development Index, which measures health, standard of living, and education.
The World Economic Forum鈥檚 Global Competitiveness Report ranks Pakistan鈥檚 primary education at 136 out of 144 countries. The country has one of the world鈥檚 lowest tax to GDP ratio, with international aid making up for low tax collection.
The military and intelligence services that dominate Pakistani national security decision-making have sacrificed the country鈥檚 progress and prosperity in their relentless pursuit of military parity with India. Forcing New Delhi鈥檚 hand on Kashmir has become more important than educating Pakistan鈥檚 children.
American readiness to offer aid has bred dependence and hubris. The U.S. has ended up as an enabler of Pakistan鈥檚 dysfunction by reinforcing the belief of its elite that it is too important to fail or be neglected.
The intermittent cycles of optimism and pessimism about Pakistan have led to confusion in Mr. Obama鈥檚 Afghan policy. It is time to finally accept Pakistan鈥檚 lack of cooperation in Afghanistan as a given while making plans for that country. The U.S. would help Afghanistan, and even Pakistan鈥檚 people, more by insisting consistently that Islamabad correct its course. Instead of telling Pakistan鈥檚 elite how important they are, it might be more useful to stop footing the bill for Pakistan鈥檚 failings.