Germany鈥檚 national security strategy (NSS), the first in the country鈥檚 history, holds few surprises. As a carefully negotiated compromise between the three-party coalition government in Berlin, it reflects Germany鈥檚 existing strategic culture more than it charts out a new one.
Even a cursory glance at the document reveals the imprint of each of the parties. It toggles between such calling cards as Green party feminism, libertarian fiscal discipline, and Social Democratic hopes for rapprochement with China.
At other times, it employs ambivalent language that renders parts of the document meaningless. The government will continue 鈥渢o adhere to its restrictive baseline policy鈥� on arms exports, for example, yet promises at the same time to weigh 鈥渁lliance and security interests, the geostrategic situation and the needs of enhanced European arms cooperation.鈥�
Yet it is not a modest document. The NSS includes grand calls to protect the 鈥渇ree democratic order,鈥� 鈥渇ree trade routes,鈥� and the 鈥渞ules-based international order with a strong United Nations at its heart鈥� but it does not explain how Berlin might secure those goals. At base, therefore, it reads more like an aspirational treatise than a security strategy.
Concretely, the NSS does make clear that the country has shed its romantic attachment to Russia. On military spending, it promises Germany will 鈥渁llocate two percent of our GDP, as an average over a multi-year period, to reach NATO capability goals.鈥� The strategy is justly proud of the country鈥檚 rapid transition away from Russian fossil fuels, and the key concept at the center of the document 鈥� Integrated Security 鈥� is defined as 鈥渃onsistently taking account of security issues鈥� in areas like supply chains. In other words, Germany is waking up to its economic dependency on China as a national security vulnerability.
Interestingly, however, the NSS states mater-of-factly that the world is now multipolar. It does not grapple with the possibility that we are instead entering an era of Sino-American bipolarity, with third states forced to coalesce around each of the poles. Instead, it clings to the idea of Beijing as an indispensable partner on global challenges. On that count, Berlin is likely to end up sorely disappointed