Even as tensions surrounding the protests that have left 20 dead here since February 14 seem to be waning鈥攃urfews have been relaxed and people are slowly returning to work鈥攖hey鈥檙e not going away. The sticking point isn鈥檛 the sectarianism that divides the Shia majority (some 65 percent of the population) and the ruling Sunnis. Nor is it that Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah see here a potential opening for their influence. The issue is older and more profound, dating back to the time two centuries ago when the al-Khalifa conquered Bahrain and the indigenous people who鈥檇 lived there for thousands of years.
Some longtime observers of Bahraini politics believe it was the call for replacing the Sunni monarchy with a republic that brought escalation. In response, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa two weeks ago invited in a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) force composed of 1,000 Saudi troops and another 500 from the United Arab Emirates.
鈥淭here was a paper signed by some of the opposition groups wanting to topple the government,鈥� says Ali Rabia, a democracy activist for over 35 years. A well-known Sunni, Rabia is proof that the opposition movement is no simple sectarian affair. 鈥淚 very much doubt these groups鈥� loyalties are with Iran,鈥� says Rabia. 鈥淭he Iranians would not treat them well, and they know it. The relationship between Persian and Arab Shia is not a good one.鈥�
Rabia notes that in 1970 the Bahrainis voted in a U.N. poll not to join Iran and to remain an independent Arab state under the al-Khalifa. Now he fears that discontent, brewing for many years, may be reaching the point of no return. In his office in downtown Manama, he shows me a copy of the document calling for a Bahraini republic and explains this is why he left his political society (use of the word 鈥減arty鈥� is outlawed). 鈥淚t was a gift to the government,鈥� says Rabia. 鈥淚t was also useful in telling the GCC states and the United States that we are facing a danger.鈥�
But the presence of what amounts to an occupying force鈥攁 foreign Sunni constabulary with no accountability to the Shia population it is policing鈥攊s only making matters worse. Some here blame the GCC forces for much of the violence, including detentions, disappearances from hospitals, midnight raids in Shia villages, and the shooting death of a 51-year-old woman, Bahia al-Aradi, as she was driving in her car.
Much of the opposition sees the government鈥檚 actions as unjustified. 鈥淪o what if some of the opposition asked for a republic?鈥� says Khalil Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq, a Shia grouping and the largest bloc in parliament until its deputies walked out in late February. 鈥淎s long as they did it peacefully, what鈥檚 the problem with that? If there were pro-regime figures on the other side who said we should leave the government alone and accept things the way they are, should we say we鈥檙e going to kill them?鈥�
Al Wefaq, explains Marzooq, is taking the middle road in pushing for a constitutional monarchy. 鈥淲e want a constitution written by the people,鈥� says Marzooq, rather than the one imposed in 2002 by the ruling family. 鈥淎nd a representative parliament.鈥� At present, the al-Khalifa鈥檚 Sunni co-religionists enjoy disproportionate representation. Before the GCC force arrived, the crown prince, Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, accepted the idea of dialogue with the opposition.
To some observers this suggested a split in the royal family, with 鈥渉ardliners鈥� taking control and summoning the GCC force. Others wondered if the decision had really been made by the Bahraini government, or if the Saudis themselves were calling the shots.
鈥淢ore than three-quarters of Bahrain鈥檚 budget comes from the Abu Saafa oil field,鈥� says Abdul Jalil Khallil, a colleague of Marzooq鈥檚 from Al Wefaq. 鈥淭hat field produces 300,000 barrels a day, half of which goes to the Saudis and the other half to Bahrain.鈥�
That is to say, Riyadh essentially determines the economic health of Bahrain. Most real estate investment in Manama is Saudi, and the Saudi royal family sees Bahrain as a vital strategic interest. Bahrain refines up to 270,000 barrels of Saudi oil a day, and trucks coursing the 16-mile King Fahd causeway between the two countries carry vital goods to Saudi Arabia. Coming the other way are Saudi tourists heading into Manama for shopping and the liberal cultural climate. They can let their hair down in the city鈥檚 bars and nightclubs.
If Bahrain serves as an escape valve for the Saudis, however, it鈥檚 precisely Bahrain鈥檚 relaxed atmosphere that poses a threat to the Saudis. 鈥淭he Saudis are not worried about sectarianism,鈥� says Nabeel Rajab, president of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights. 鈥淪hia make up only 20 percent of the Saudi population. They鈥檙e worried about democracy, or anything that would wrest power out of their hands.鈥�
If the Saudis see Bahrain as a place to project power and dishearten their own opposition before it takes off, other observers argue that it wasn鈥檛 the Saudis who made the decision to send in troops.
鈥淭he Bahraini establishment was under intense pressure from the United States to enter a dialogue,鈥� says one source close to the government. 鈥淭he Americans did not want to see any use of force. So the Bahrainis鈥� hands were tied, and they brought in the Saudis because of their special relationship with the Americans.鈥� In other words, bringing in Riyadh was meant to shield Manama from Washington鈥檚 scrutiny.
Manama has more than enough firepower to quell any uprising all on its own. Bahrain, with a population of 1.2 million, has some 40,000 troops鈥攁 larger army than Tunisia, which has 10.5 million people. Add the security forces (police), the national guard, and the intelligence services, and Bahrain has more armed forces per citizen than just about anywhere else in the world. The vast majority of those forces, moreover, consist of foreigners from Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Syria, and Sudan that the government has made citizens in an effort to tilt the sectarian balance in its favor. The number of Shia in the armed forces is minuscule.
Why is the army so large? The al-Khalifa are afraid of Iran, but that鈥檚 why the U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in Manama: to protect Gulf oil and its producers from hostile external forces. The GCC forces are supposed to serve the same purpose. And yet the king congratulated the commander of the GCC forces as though he鈥檇 waged a successful campaign against foreign invaders rather than Bahrainis. This is because the royal family does not perceive the Shia community as part of their own people.
鈥淚t鈥檚 a tribal matter,鈥� says one Shia intellectual. 鈥淚t鈥檚 not sectarian. It goes back to pre-Islamic days when the tribes invaded each other. You have the Bedouin and you have the towns-people. For the Bedouin there were eight months of raiding, raping, and robbing each year and four months of rest. The al-Khalifa conquered this island. They are the winners and we are the losers, and they believe they owe us nothing. This is Bedouin style鈥攚ho has the sword can do what he likes.鈥�
The al-Khalifa play the sectarian card because it has resonance with Bahraini Sunnis and with Washington, which fears Iranian influence in any Shia movement.
In reality, the ruling families of the Arab Gulf states are more like a confederation of organized crime families. Each has a stake in the others鈥� maintaining their power and collecting tribute. Most of the families originated in the Nejd region of what is now Saudi Arabia. The al-Khalifa started there and moved first to Kuwait, where their cousins, the Al-Sabah, rule. From Kuwait they went to Qatar, ruled by the Al-Thani, another Nejdi tribe, and then to Bahrain.
鈥淭herefore,鈥� says my Shia informant, 鈥渢he Shia have to be under them. But it wouldn鈥檛 matter if all the Shia one day converted to Judaism or Christianity or even Sunni Islam, because the bottom line would still be the same. We lost.鈥�
If Bahrain seems to be getting back to normal, it鈥檚 also true that a GCC force cannot put down a protest movement whose roots go back long before the recent regional wave of uprisings kicked off in December. Khalil Al Marzooq says indigenous Bahrainis have been agitating for their rights since the 1920s. 鈥淚f you keep repressing people,鈥� says Marzooq, 鈥渆ventually they鈥檒l respond. People cannot continue to live like this.鈥�
Manama, Bahrain