The Biden administration has slowed down the American rush to the exits in Afghanistan. On the campaign trail, himself to ending 鈥渇orever wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East.鈥� But his promise to 鈥渂ring the vast majority of our troops home from Afghanistan鈥� was qualified by a vow to 鈥渇ocus our mission on al Qaeda and ISIS.鈥�
In the first few days of his presidency, Biden has made it clear that he is not willing to let the Taliban have its way as the price for ending the war in Afghanistan. The between the U.S. government and the Taliban, signed in Doha last year, was predicated on the Taliban鈥檚 promise to cut off ties with al Qaeda. Amid of al Qaeda gaining strength in Afghanistan, the Biden administration has reason to believe that the Taliban has failed to keep that promise.
Critics of the Doha agreement, including this author, have consistently argued that it prioritized U.S. withdrawal without specific concomitant obligations on the Taliban. By signaling its eagerness to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, the Trump administration made the Taliban more intransigent in its attitude toward the democratic government established in Kabul with U.S. help.
After signing the agreement with the Taliban, the Trump administration鈥檚 special envoy for Afghanistan reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, put pressure on the Kabul government to make concessions to the Taliban, such as releasing Taliban prisoners. But he failed to condemn the Taliban for its continued across Afghanistan, preferring generic condemnations of violence.
The reason for Khalilzad鈥檚 muted response to Taliban attacks lay in the language of the Doha agreement. The Taliban had made no commitment to a ceasefire and had only that 鈥淎 permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the agenda of the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations.鈥�
Under pressure from to expedite withdrawal of U.S. troops, Khalilzad had been forced to craft an agreement that promised an American withdrawal without an express promise from the Taliban to end violence or to accept the Afghan government as a negotiating partner.
But the Taliban are students of Islamic sharia law and, in their belief system, an agreement is binding only in its literal sense. Khalilzad鈥檚 of a 鈥渞eduction in violence鈥� as a result of the U.S.-Taliban agreement had not been explicitly stated in the Doha agreement, a major flaw of the signed document. From its point of view, the Taliban had not promised an end to violence and had only agreed to talk about ending violence with other Afghans.
Moreover, the Taliban has repeatedly made it clear that it sees the U.S.-Afghan agreement as being an of the Taliban鈥檚 鈥渧ictory鈥� and a means of ending 鈥淎merican occupation.&rdquo
In the Taliban鈥檚 narrative, it had established an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan in 1995, which was unlawfully removed from power by American and NATO forces in 2001. The withdrawal of U.S. forces would now restore the emirate as Afghanistan鈥檚 .
The that followed the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement was a non-starter because the Taliban refused to respect the gains for the Afghan people of the last 19 years. The Taliban acted as if it was talking, as victors of a civil war, to other Afghan factions about a power sharing agreement, albeit on the Taliban鈥檚 terms.
Rumors about the imminence of an interim government raised the hopes of prominent Afghans who cannot win an election without securing ministerial positions. Khalilzad effectively weakened the hand of President Ashraf Ghani鈥檚 government by giving the impression that American and European diplomats, not Afghans, might determine who would run Afghanistan after the Americans leave.
A better approach would have been, and still could be, to let the Taliban know that the U.S. would maintain a smaller military footprint in Afghanistan indefinitely and that it supported Afghanistan鈥檚 government in finding a settlement with the Taliban. Even Pakistan, which facilitated U.S. dialogue with the Taliban and has long provided sanctuary to the group鈥檚 leaders, now seems to support such an approach while a hasty U.S. withdrawal as 鈥渦nwise.鈥�
The Biden administration has sensibly reversed course on bypassing the Kabul government in the peace process. Among his first calls to foreign leaders, National Security Advisor with Afghan National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib, promising to review the U.S.-Taliban agreement. The review would include an assessment of the Taliban鈥檚 fulfillment of 鈥渃ommitments to cut ties with terrorist groups, to reduce violence in Afghanistan and to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Afghan government and other stakeholders.鈥�
In a separate call with President Ghani, Secretary of State Tony Blinken spoke of 鈥渁n enduring U.S.-Afghan partnership鈥� and emphasized the need to preserve 鈥渢he progress made over the last 20 years with regard to human rights, civil liberties, and the role of women in Afghan society.鈥� This was a far cry from the messaging of the previous administration, which centered on U.S. military withdrawal.
Khalilzad is being retained in his position for now, recognizing that the relationship he has developed with the Taliban could be useful. But the U.S. special envoy must now deliver a clear message to the Taliban: It will be accommodated within Afghanistan鈥檚 existing structure as the price for peace but should stop expecting to rule Afghanistan again.
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