Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, India鈥攚hich is currently a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council鈥攈as drawn scrutiny for having abstained multiple times on votes in the Security Council, U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Human Rights Council on resolutions criticizing the Russian aggression. Instead, the calling for an 鈥渋mmediate cessation of violence鈥� in Ukraine, without publicly condemning Russia鈥檚 actions鈥攁 move that pleased neither its Western partners nor Russia.
The Russian-Ukraine war puts India in a difficult position. On the one hand, India wants to avoid antagonizing the U.S., a long-time partner with which it has multifaceted and deepening ties. On the other, ongoing tensions with Pakistan and China require India to preserve its relationship with Russia, which is one of New Delhi鈥檚 leading suppliers of weapons and defense equipment.
Although the Biden administration has its disappointment over New Delhi鈥檚 repeated failure to condemn President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 actions is palpable. American officials have identified India as a reliable U.S. partner in Washington鈥檚 Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China, and they clearly expected more from India in view of their emerging strategic alignment.
Soon after the recent virtual meeting of the leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue鈥攐r the Quad, comprising the U.S., India, Japan and Australia鈥攐n March 3, stated that while the U.S. understands New Delhi鈥檚 鈥渉istoric, long-standing relationship with Russia,鈥� there was hope that 鈥淚ndia will be moving in our direction.鈥�
Derek Chollet, a senior policy adviser to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, would bring its 鈥渋nfluence to bear on Russia to get them to change course.鈥�
But this is unlikely, for several reasons. Indian scholars and policymakers often argue that driving other countries鈥� strategic calculations, perhaps because the United States has a natural advantage when it comes to geography, with no threats on its immediate land or maritime borders. By contrast, India must manage ongoing tensions with nuclear-armed powers on two borders, with China to the north and Pakistan to the west.
New Delhi鈥檚 current balancing act on the war in Ukraine must therefore be understood in the context of the role that Moscow has historically played in helping India counter both China and Pakistan. Russia emerged as India鈥檚 primary defense supplier during the Cold War, when the West was reluctant to share technology with India and the Soviet Union helped build India鈥檚 industrial base, especially in the defense sector.
Russia remains and arsenal is still of Russian origin. Between 2016 and 2020, Russia accounted for which in turn Russian manufacturers have also offered their top-of-the-line weapons systems to India when U.S. companies have held back.
New Delhi鈥檚 tendency toward fence-sitting will be increasingly difficult to sustain because of India鈥檚 evolving strategic partnership with the United States.
For instance, when India first considered purchasing the Russian S-400 missile defense system, the U.S. was slow to propose a comparable alternative. When it did eventually or THAAD, and Patriot Advance Capability, or PAC-3, missile defense systems, the price tag was $15 billion. India ended up paying Russia a third of that when it risking U.S. sanctions under the to do so.
Similarly, when India planned to modernize its air force, its preferred option was the It was disappointed when all that Washington was willing to offer was instead the older F-16.
In these and other cases, Washington鈥檚 unwillingness to transfer technology has been a major stumbling block in military relations with India. Cost is another factor.
The dollar value of India鈥檚 defense trade with the United States, which went from now far outstrips the military equipment it imports from Russia. And as India tries to upgrade its weapons systems and aircraft, it will find Russian technology less desirable than U.S., French and Israeli alternatives.
But in the meantime, Russia鈥檚 cheap equipment and its willingness to share technology remain attractive amid an Indian defense acquisition process that Western companies find to be labyrinthine.
Apart from India鈥檚 need to maintain its security relationship with Russia, there are other strategic considerations at play in its current position on the war in Ukraine. While the U.S. is now waking up to the prospect of peer competition with China, India has always seen China as a threat. And it is in India鈥檚 interest to ensure that Russia does not side with China in India-China disputes.
This careful diplomatic tightrope is nothing new for India. As part of its desire for strategic autonomy, New Delhi has often maintained relations simultaneously with countries that are antagonistic toward one another鈥擨ran and Israel, for instance, as well as Iran and the Arab Gulf States. Russia and the United States can now be added to that list.
Nor is this the first time India has tried to avoid taking sides in conflicts, going back to the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Afghanistan in 1979. Even in 1990, when Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, that 鈥渢he great nation of India鈥� condemn the invasion and refused to go beyond 鈥渄eploring鈥� the move.
India did not want to upset Hussein, notwithstanding the moral and legal case against his aggression. Iraq was one of India鈥檚 key suppliers of oil and a major market for Indian exports at the time and had supported India rather than Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute at the Organization of Islamic Countries. Then-External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujral was even photographed giving Hussein a bearhug in Baghdad in August 1990, soon after the start of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
It took years for New Delhi to repair the damage its stance on the invasion of Kuwait did to India鈥檚 relations with the Arab Gulf countries. Indian diplomats seem prepared, once again, to risk hurting New Delhi鈥檚 relations with Ukraine, European governments and the U.S., among others, by their current policy on Russia.
But while New Delhi鈥檚 tendency toward fence-sitting may be a variation of its non-alignment during the Cold War, it is increasingly difficult to sustain because of India鈥檚 evolving strategic partnership with the United States. And unlike its ties with the U.S., India鈥檚 relations with Russia are not multifaceted. There is no Indian diaspora in Russia comparable to the one in the U.S., and bilateral trade, at $ to India鈥檚 not withstanding, there is little similarity in the positions of India and Russia on most regional and international issues, whereas India鈥檚 vision for Indo-Pacific security is closely aligned with the United States.
Although it has managed to preserve its ties with Moscow so far, New Delhi will find it difficult to continue its balancing act moving forward. As the world鈥檚 democracies array against Putin鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, India will face greater pressure to align with the democratic world or lose its standing with its Western partners.
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