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Many legal experts contend that the administrative state has grown out of control. It adjudicates more disputes than the federal courts, passes more “laws�� than Congress, and controls vast amounts of resources both directly and indirectly. A variety of Constitutional features designed to impede the growth of unchecked discretion in the hands of unelected government authorities has failed to limit these developments.

Two legal doctrines in particular have fallen short of their objective to contain administrative rulemaking: guidelines on judicial review, now associated with deference doctrines, and limitations on the delegation of legislative powers. On May 2, ����� hosted the Honorable Ron Cass, dean emeritus of Boston University School of Law, for a discussion examining the role these doctrines should play, what has happened to them, and what might be done to revise and revive them. Hudson Senior Fellow Harold Furchtgott-Roth moderated the conversation.