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One reason the Obama administration has sought to "reset" relations with Moscow is to secure greater Russian help in constraining Iran's nuclear program. Thus far, Russian policy makers have indicated that Moscow might support some additional sanctions designed to signal international displeasure with Tehran, but they have rejected imposing "crippling" sanctions that might compel the Iranian government to end its opposition to UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting its pursuit of sensitive nuclear activities.

Do Russian and U.S. interests regarding Iran diverge so fundamentally that Moscow is unlikely to provide the assistance the Obama administration desires to constrain the Iranian nuclear program? What are the likely impacts on U.S. strategic interests in Eurasia more generally of the Russian reset? What do the Russians see as the strategic opportunities and challenges that flow from the more relaxed American position? What kind of Russian strategies should we be preparing for?

����� held a panel discussion of these and others issues assessing the emerging U.S.-Russia-Iran strategic recalibration.