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This article originally appeared in German in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte.

In June 2018, seventeen months into Donald Trump’s first term as president of the United States, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the doyen of U.S. diplomacy, that “Trump may be one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up its old pretenses.��

Kissinger’s insight has proven prescient. Whatever illusions Europeans and Americans held that the first Trump administration would leave no footprint in the history books have been dashed by Trump’s reelection. Joe Biden now embodies the past, while Donald Trump represents the future. 

Trump, now, is not a footnote but a harbinger of how the style and conduct of foreign relations could change in the middle decades of the twenty-first century. By studying Trump, Europe can better engage the United States, steel itself for the turbulence to come, and position itself in the world of tomorrow. 

As my colleague, Walter Russell Mead, has observed, the information revolution of today is disrupting the West as fundamentally as the industrial revolution changed societies in the century. It would be foolish to think that such profound societal changes could leave our politics unaffected. The U.S. is only one of many Western countries whose political conventions have been upended in a maelstrom of economic and social change. 

The intensity of that storm is the product of two converging trends. The first is deindustrialization. In the post-Cold War era, the West established a web of institutions and initiatives known as the Washington Consensus to advance liberalism around the world. For three of the past four decades, however, that system has failed to solve the basic challenge of twenty-first century governance: how can free and open societies protect themselves against actors who wish to do them harm from within? In the 2000s, this conundrum applied most acutely to international terrorism, but lately it has been associated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Today, it is commonplace in America to hear the criticism that liberal institutions like the World Trade Organization facilitated rather than blocked the growth of a duplicitous PRC. As it has risen to superpower status, the PRC has pulled down America’s manufacturing economy and left its industrial heartland hollowed out.

Second, the world is experiencing revolutionary changes in how it consumes information. This democratization of information has given new voices, including critics of the liberal system, a social media platform through which to challenge the status quo. These voices have befuddled the legacy media, which has reacted with one unforced error after another. Over time, many Americans have begun to associate the traditional media with ideological liberalism. By last year, JD Vance’s that “you have to rethink the entire project�� of the liberal order was seen more as a political asset than a liability in propelling his rise from senator to vice president.

Of course, it is possible to overstate these shifts in U.S. politics. Many political leaders in the United States, including in the Republican Party, continue to see the Bretton Woods institutions and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as building blocks of American power. But U.S. foreign policy is becoming increasingly transactional and nationalist, and less values-based and multilateral. This trend carries seven implications for Europe.

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First, Europe should not count on unlimited American support for the project of European integration. In areas where the U.S. believes the EU can advance or hinder American commercial interests, Washington will engage. For example, Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick has sought to build relations with Maroš Šefčovič, the EU’s powerful Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security. But in those competencies where the EU is relatively underdeveloped, like foreign and security policy, Washington is likely to show little interest in Brussels. In late February, Secretary of State Marco Rubio to meet Kaja Kallas, Europe’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, after she had already traveled to Washington, attributing the decision to “scheduling issues.�� The new Trump administration will see Europe less as a unified actor and more as a mosaic of nation-states with varying interests and priorities, many of which are often in competition. 

Second, Europe cannot use the shared sacrifice of decades past to justify today’s transatlantic alliance. President Trump is more likely to let his frustration with European free-riding and trade surpluses color his perceptions of the transatlantic alliance than any appeals to the past. There are exceptions to this rule. President Trump’s affinity for the United Kingdom, affection for President Macron, and appreciation of Polish defense spending offer Europe openings. But Trump is intent on recasting the transatlantic relationship in favor of the United States, with his own inauguration as the starting point. What matters is the here and now—and what European nations are prepared to do today to rebalance what Trump sees as a one-sided relationship with the United States. 

Third, Europe should not expect President Trump to speak the language of soft power. Given his penchant for marketing, it may come as a surprise that President Trump puts little stock in soft power. In his reading of the world, however, countries are motivated by the pursuit of national interest rather than some altruistic sense of duty to a values-based alliance. In the first six weeks of his administration, Trump has rattled stalwart allies like Canada and Denmark and upset key partners like Mexico and Ukraine. Whether these countries are unsettled or offended by his behavior is immaterial to him. In his mind, what will dictate their actions is a dispassionate reading of the national interest. 

Fourth, Europe must come to grips with the fact that it is no longer the primum mobile of global affairs. President Trump does not believe in European exceptionalism. In his thinking, Europe is far from the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy. Instead, the Trump administration is devoting at least as much time and effort to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia as it is Europe. In fact, Europe’s significance as a source of foreign direct investment and trade only reinforces the Trump administration’s view that the continent is wealthy enough to tackle most of its security problems on its own. As Trump signaled in early March, the administration will keep score on which countries are meeting their defense spending commitments and which continue to lag. This does not mean that the United States will walk away from NATO altogether, but it raises about Article V of the Washington Treaty.

Fifth, Europe should recognize that President Trump is intent on being remembered as a peacemaker of historic significance. The Trump administration rarely misses an opportunity to talk about the importance of peace. As Trump said in his , he would like his legacy to be defined by the “wars that we end and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.�� This is most obviously on display in his Ukraine policy, but it is also an organizing idea in the Middle East, where Trump’s top priority is to extend the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Trump would prefer to avoid war with Iran. As he his Iran policy in early February, “There’s two ways of stopping them: with bombs or with a written piece of paper. I’d much rather do a deal that’s not going to hurt them.�� And yet, Trump possesses an ability to issue threats and pursue rapprochement at the same time. In his first term, he threatened North Korea with destruction before unfreezing relations with Kim Jong Un. A similar pattern is emerging today, with Trump both threatening and engaging Hamas simultaneously at the time of this writing. In a related vein, the Trump administration will continue to double down on hostage diplomacy, which has already secured the release of Americans held by Venezuela, Russia, and, as of this writing, Hamas.

Sixth, Europe should prepare for the U.S. to reset relations with Russia. Over the past several years, those now serving at the seniormost levels of the Trump administration watched in dismay as Russia and the PRC formed an axis of influence on the Eurasian landmass. “The one thing you never want to happen is you never want Russia and China uniting,�� Trump on the campaign trail in November. “I’m going to have to un-unite them, and I think I can do that, too. I have to un-unite them.�� Ahead of the Munich Security Conference, Vance the administration’s thinking further. “It’s not in Putin’s interest to be the little brother in a coalition with China,�� he argued. Because Russia’s status as junior partner to China grates on Russia’s nationalists, so this thinking goes, Moscow is ready for an economic and political alternative to Beijing. Motivated by the search for strategic stability, the Trump administration will pursue a comprehensive reset with Moscow around the world.

Seventh, the EU should recognize that the U.S. is frustrated by European opportunism. Trump’s toward the EU derives in part from the fact that Europe is big enough to be inflexible toward the U.S. on economic matters while remaining dependent on Washington in the military arena. Oftentimes, the continent unites into a bloc or divides along lines of national interest depending on what suits it best in its relations with the U.S. This grates on Trump, whose Asian allies have shown more flexibility toward the U.S. while moralizing less. 

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Each of these seven implications may have Europeans in disbelief. Together, they leave Europe facing a new era. While it is trite to say that change brings opportunities, the sooner Europe updates its playbook for the new era that is upon it, the better it is likely to fare.

For starters, Europe should show an appreciation for American support. This need not take the form of groveling. At times, however, a form of soft anti-Americanism fashionable among European elites makes its way into the X feed of senior U.S. administration officials. In the world of social media, even vignettes or offhand comments that are dismissive of the United States or President Trump are easily manipulated into viral posts on TikTok and other social media platforms. To a nationalist and populist U.S. administration focused on domestic affairs and sensitive to slights, digs from senior Europeans will go over like a lead balloon. 

Second, Europe should offer to partner with the U.S. on concrete peace initiatives. It could make these overtures in conflicts beyond Ukraine, like the ongoing negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Europe should do what is in its power to facilitate those talks by coordinating with Washington and winning influence with key officials along the way. Moreover, Europe can utilize the access key leaders like Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni have gained to the Trump administration to build a transatlantic bridge on Ukraine policy. In the first Trump term, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) endeared themselves to Republican leaders through a combination of plucky nationalism, pro-American attitudes, and increased defense spending. From Poland to Lithuania to the Czech Republic, CEE countries are as well-positioned as any to shape U.S. policy if they offer their advice constructively, including on the war in Ukraine.  

Third, Europe may wish to consider high-profile commercial diplomacy with the United States. Because Trump sees the world through the lens of business, foreign direct investment (FDI) from Europe makes an impression on the White House—and can secure senior leaders on the presidential calendar. In turn, such announcements can help Europe form a more positive relationship with the U.S. and catalyze a dynamic that can pay dividends over time. 

Fourth, Europe should prioritize economic growth over social spending. Europe risks falling behind the U.S. (and the PRC) in the critical technologies that will determine the future of the global order, from artificial intelligence to quantum computing. Rather than regulating these technologies through the single market, Europe should pursue policies that allow the continent to master them altogether. Absent innovation, Europe will fade into irrelevance. To capture the respect and attention of the U.S., European countries must step up their economic performance. 

Fifth, European countries must address their shortcomings in defense. It stands to reason that Europe wants to become more self-reliant and less dependent on the United States. At the same time, Europe is unable to replace the American defense market any time soon. In the artillery-rocket segment, for example, no European nation except Türkiye produces multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) like the American-made M-142 HIMARS and M-270. Europe also has no available substitute for American air and missile defense interceptors. Europe’s deficiencies in defense are even worse in next-generation warfare, from space technologies to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). By supporting the American defense industrial base in these areas, Europe can win some plaudits at the White House while helping itself.

Sixth, as the U.S. attempts to drive a stake between Russia and the PRC, Europe should prepare to resist a charm offensive from Beijing. Today, there are three, and only three, economic centers in the world: North America, Europe, and East Asia. Kissingerian triangulation teaches that in such a world, it is best to be in the twosome rather than alone. European officials should explain to their U.S. counterparts that the PRC will attempt to exploit any fissures in the transatlantic relationship to neutralize Europe in Sino-American competition. Beijing will offer to exercise its influence in Moscow in return for European acquiescence to the PRC’s bad behavior elsewhere. By engaging Washington on this issue, Europe can clarify the broader strategic implications of the war in Ukraine and support of NATO for U.S. decision makers. America should want Europe on its side. 

Seventh, Europe has an opportunity to fill the gaps that America’s downsizing of foreign assistance has created in Europe and the global south. In its first weeks in office, the Trump administration slashed its foreign assistance programs and rewired its development institutions. This may present commercial opportunities for Europe. Moreover, in frontier states like Moldova, EU assistance can pick up where U.S. support is winding down. Europe can frame its support as an alternative to the malign influence of Beijing and Moscow, and as an expression of transatlantic burden-sharing. 

Eighth, Europe may wish to consider proactive recommendations to preempt any Trump administration moves to pull U.S. forces from Europe. It seems likely that the U.S. will withdraw some conventional forces from the continent as part of a broader strategic review. At the same time, however, Washington has made little noise about its nuclear sharing agreements. To shore up deterrence, European states may wish to press the Trump administration to couple any U.S. troop withdrawals with updates in NATO’s nuclear sharing, with a special emphasis on CEE. It is no secret, for example, that Poland would welcome such a deployment on its soil. 

Ninth, Europe should learn from Japan. In the 1970s, Japan watched the U.S. transition from supporting the Republic of China to backing the People’s Republic of China. While Europe basked in the victory of liberal democracy at the end of the Cold War, Asia recognized that U.S. foreign policy was not a morality play. This led Tokyo to take a focused, practical approach toward Washington. Even before President Trump’s second inauguration, Japan sought to engage the incoming administration with concrete ideas for cooperation before Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s to the White House in February. In the second Trump administration, European leaders should emulate Shinzo Abe and Shigeru Ishiba rather than Angela Merkel and Olaf Scholz. 

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The second Trump administration is shaking Europe to its core. But the transatlantic alliance can survive. With a proactive approach, Europe has the chance to transform its countries from U.S. protectorates into full-fledged partners. The centerpiece of this effort should be the war in Ukraine. 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the most pressing crisis Europe faces. Whether Putin succeeds in subordinating Ukraine, either through outright military conquest or merely through hybrid means, will depend on the extent to which Europe is prepared to back Kyiv. By pressing for talks, Trump is forcing Europe to confront its own weaknesses now before Russia starts a military confrontation with a NATO member state later. 

Far too many Western leaders have hidden behind hopeful rhetoric about Ukraine’s future membership in NATO, which raised expectations in Kyiv even as the U.S. and Germany remained united in opposition to such a step. Now the moment has arrived where Europe is facing hard choices about whether it is willing and able to take the lead in defending Ukraine. A good first step would be for Europe’s major powers to push for the confiscation of Russia’s frozen assets, almost all of which sit in European . Next, it should examine its political structure.

Today, NATO is dominated by the U.S., while the EU is slowed by a laborious, consensual decision-making process. By exposing Europe to Russian power without withdrawing from the continent altogether, Trump has shocked Europe into action. But he has not pulled back to the point that the continent’s historical rivalries are spilling into open conflict. This gives the major powers of Europe the chance to forge a coalition of the willing that can establish deterrence separate from Washington.

None of this is to suggest that Europe should give up on the transatlantic alliance, which remains indispensable for its security. But it should think creatively about how to strengthen continental defenses. Such an endeavor would be worthy of Kissinger, and the new era we have now entered.