One can only be thankful that Russia now claims that in the wake of 聳 the latest enactment under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter putting sanctions on Iran for its defiance of its nonproliferation obligations and a growing list of other legally-binding resolutions 聳 It was a disgrace for Russia to offer the the first place, since at the time it agreed to sell Iran that missile (in 2007) everyone understood that the purpose of this system was to defend Iran聮s unlawful nuclear weapons program against possible preemption.
It would, of course, have been an even bigger disgrace for Moscow actually to provide the system, and it was disheartening 聳 to say the least 聳 that Russian officials told the press on June 16 that the S-300 wasn聮t covered by Resolution 1929. So I聮m certainly glad that
The problem, however, is that the anonymous Russian source for this seemingly reassuring press spin is just blowing smoke. As initial Kremlin statements after Resolution 1929聮s passage correctly made clear 聳 and as Russian and American officials are now apparently both trying to obscure 聳 Moscow seems to have carved out its S-300 deal from the arms embargo that is otherwise imposed by the resolution. Let聮s look at the details.
Operative paragraph 8 of Resolution 1929 imposes an expanded arms embargo on Iran. Enacted pursuant to the Security Council聮s authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, this provision says that:
联聪
It sounds pretty good, doesn't it? Paragraph 8 is a legally-binding obligation, and on its face looks quite impressive. But all is not quite what it seems.
Under Resolution 1929, it is thus now illegal to provide Iran with 联missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.聪 But anyone who reads the Register聮s definitions 聳 and I聮d encourage the NPF reader to consult 聳 will note that they do not cover systems such as the S-300. In the definitions used by the Register, 联missiles and missile launchers聪 includes:
联聪
Note that last bit: the Register聮s definition expressly 联does not include ground-to-air missiles.聪 I don聮t know about you, but my guess is that Resolution 1929聮s choice of this definition is not just some weird and unfortunate accident.
Here we have a joke played upon us by whomever crafted the Resolution: the much-vaunted arms embargo that has now been imposed upon Iran carefully carves out an exception for the most significant and proliferation-facilitating conventional arms transfer presently on the horizon. It聮s nice, of course, that it is now illegal to give Iran battle tanks and armored personnel carriers, but the transfer about which everyone 聳 including Iran 聳 cared the most was the S-300. How amazing to have exempted it.
The Obama Administration, which negotiated and agreed to the sanctions resolution, clearly realizes this. 聪 There is no mistaking Crowley聮s careful phrasing in describing Moscow聮s decision to exercise discretion, at least for now, in not transferring a weapons system that is not embargoed.
The Obama Administration is understandably eager to make sure we know that Russia does not, at present, choose to provide air defenses for Iran聮s nuclear weapons program. The White House is also clearly not eager to admit that the Kremlin persuaded it to agree to a resolution that actually permits this. Both of these things are true, however, and both deserve to be borne in mind as we evaluate the likely impact of Resolution 1929 upon Iran聮s behavior, upon the credibility of the nonproliferation regime, and upon the Obama Administration聮s reputation for diplomatic competence.