Another meaningless Pakistani election has attracted another burst of world media attention. Last week, voters gave the party of former cricket player Imran Khan a plurality in Parliament, making him the likely next prime minister. The press is full of accounts of what Mr. Khan鈥檚 victory means for the troubled country. But the real decisions in Pakistan are made by unelected military officers鈥攁nd the media鈥檚 dutiful coverage of the nation鈥檚 all but ceremonial electoral process is a major propaganda victory for the permanent ruling establishment.
Pakistan matters, even if its elections don鈥檛. It is the world鈥檚 only nuclear state with deep ties to terror groups. And its national-security elite believes it is locked in an existential competition with India, its much larger, richer and more technologically advanced southern neighbor. Yet Pakistan simply does not have the economic capacity to keep up this security competition. That has been true since the partition in 1947, and it became more pronounced when India helped East Pakistan emerge as independent Bangladesh in 1971.
Pakistan鈥檚 security disadvantage has always had a profound impact on its politics. The imbalance has driven Pakistan鈥檚 concentration of power in the hands of the military, its quest for nuclear weapons to counteract India鈥檚 edge in conventional warfare, its dependence on patrons and paymasters to bridge the resource gap, and its deepening reliance on Islam as a legitimating force.
There is little room for actual democracy under these circumstances, or so Pakistan鈥檚 rulers believe. But they have come to understand the advantages of a democratic charade. The blame for problems with public services like sewers, roads and schools鈥攐ften exacerbated by the resource constraints imposed by the military鈥檚 security fixation鈥攃an be shifted onto politicians. When political parties become enmeshed in corruption scandals, the military presents itself as the clean and patriotic alternative, siding with the people against a crooked elite. The political pageantry currently being indulged by the press diverts attention from the hard fact of military rule without endangering the national-security establishment鈥檚 position at the heart of the state. Even controversies over the fairness of the election process contribute to the effectiveness of the dictatorship鈥檚 disguise.
Not that electoral competition in Pakistan is entirely without consequences. Politicians who win elections don鈥檛 gain power over the strategic direction of the state, but they do win government jobs and lucrative contracts for family and friends, along with other rewards and emoluments of office. The rival clans and ethnic groups who back Pakistan鈥檚 political parties sincerely want their side to win. Favored access to the governmental piggy bank is no small thing, and collaborating in a sham process that keeps the military in power is a small price to pay.
The most important story in Pakistan today is not the elevation of Mr. Khan, the military鈥檚 preferred candidate. It is that the U.S., Pakistan鈥檚 principal ally during both the Cold War and the war on terror, is no longer interested in subsidizing a partner it needs and trusts less and less. Pakistan鈥檚 military rulers are therefore seeking a new patron, and China is eager to fill the void.
Beijing is attracted to Pakistan for many reasons. Geographically, Pakistan is a corridor to the Middle East, making it an important theater for China鈥檚 One Belt, One Road initiative. Economically, Pakistan鈥檚 need for infrastructure investment and its large domestic market offer significant opportunities for Chinese business. Politically, China has a severe shortage of allies relative to the U.S.; a strong relationship with Pakistan would enhance its position.
But Pakistan is a problematic ally. Will the country that backed terror groups in Afghanistan and sheltered Osama bin Laden be as faithless to Beijing as it was to Washington? If China embraces Pakistan too closely, will that drive the more powerful country of India more tightly into America鈥檚 embrace?
Meanwhile, Pakistan needs massive loans to stay afloat. There already is talk that Pakistan will turn to the International Monetary Fund for a $10 billion to $12 billion loan next year. Chinese loans connected to the One Belt, One Road initiative often come with tight strings and preconditions; the amount of financial slack that China cuts Pakistan will be an early sign of where the relationship is headed.
Pakistan鈥檚 generals hope China will be an all-weather friend, subsidizing Pakistan鈥檚 economy indefinitely, backing it against India, and overlooking the security establishment鈥檚 deep ties to radical Islamists. Mr. Khan will faithfully support Pakistan鈥檚 new direction and perpetuate the pretense that Pakistani civilian politicians have real power.
As the priorities of the U.S. change, an Islamabad-Beijing relationship is taking shape. More than anything that Pakistan鈥檚 impotent civilian politicians say or do, that relationship between Pakistan鈥檚 military rulers and China鈥檚 Communist Party will determine the future of one of the most dangerous countries and regions in the world.