Imran Khan鈥檚 first address to the nation as Pakistan鈥檚 prime minister devoted more time to discussing ending corruption, improving education, and ensuring better garbage collection in cities. He said little about ending Pakistan鈥檚 reputation as a terrorist safe haven or how he might face the country鈥檚 relative global isolation.
The reason for Khan鈥檚 choice of priorities is the same as the reason why several members of his cabinet are individuals who also served in the military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf. The issues he listed matter to his support base, which essentially comprises the pro-military salaried class.
Most of them were comfortable during Musharraf鈥檚 rule and would be happy to be led to the lost paradise by an energetic civilian celebrity.
That is not to say corruption, lack of education and sanitation are not important issues. They are. But they are a result of Pakistan鈥檚 state of permanent crisis, not the reason.
Moreover, Pakistan鈥檚 constitution makes provincial governments responsible for education while garbage collection is the responsibility of local governments. Neither falls under the prime minister鈥檚 purview although his attention could certainly help improve service delivery in both realms.
Still, that is insufficient reason for the newly selected prime minister of a nuclear-armed country to speak like a mayor or a provincial leader and avoid addressing matters that interest the rest of the world.
Khan is the latest celebrity who has translated his success as a cricket star into high political office. That he did so with the help of Pakistan鈥檚 ubiquitous intelligence services and the military is not in doubt. But even if he had succeeded all on his own, he would have had the same handicap that celebrity leaders have everywhere else.
As Michael Gerson recently posed the question in The Washington Post in context of another celebrity leader, 鈥淚s the skill set of the celebrity suited to the reality of governing?鈥�
鈥淭he culture of celebrity,鈥� Gerson wrote, 鈥渆levates appearance over accomplishment鈥�. In this culture, 鈥渞ivalries and feuds are essential to the storyline,鈥� and 鈥渋t encourages theatrical bitterness. Instead of pursuing a policy vision, the first calling of the celebrity is to maintain a brand鈥�.
Celebrities seldom get the scrutiny that politicians do before their rise to power. The celebrity, according to Gerson, is likely to use 鈥渢he power of his office to pursue personal vendettas. Instead of yelling at the television when people displease him, he now has the power to hurt them in practical ways鈥�.
Khan鈥檚 rise to power was based on painting his rivals as venal and corrupt. He has now promised to put them on trial for corruption. But, as Pakistan鈥檚 history has repeatedly shown, accusing civilian leaders of corruption with the help of a subjugated media is easier than convicting them through due process.
Within 48 hours of being sworn in, Khan discovered that his assumption of lavish expenditure on the prime minister鈥檚 official residence from the exchequer by Nawaz Sharif was wrong. Apparently, Sharif dutifully to reimburse his personal expenses and those of his family.
Other similar revelations probably also await. Middle class Pakistanis might like Khan鈥檚 claims about transforming the prime minister鈥檚 house into a university or reducing expenses on catering for official events. But catering expenses are a drop in the bucket of Pakistan鈥檚 huge deficit, and the gimmick of transforming a residential building into a university might end up incurring significant costs.
For several decades, salaried Pakistanis 鈥� soldiers, civil servants, doctors and engineers often employed by the government and their offspring who have grown up in government residences and cantonments 鈥� have been fed a simplified national narrative.
Pakistan, they are told, is a special country created by God and endowed with natural wealth and productive people. The common explanation for Pakistan鈥檚 relatively uninspiring economic performance is that the country鈥檚 riches are regularly plundered by corrupt politicians and civil servants, making it seem poorer than it is.
Every backdoor intervention in Pakistan鈥檚 politics has been predicated on the assumption that an honest leader can help recover the billions of dollars siphoned off from the economy and stashed in bank accounts abroad, although no large-scale repatriation of stolen Pakistani wealth has ever occurred.
It is not unusual for Khan鈥檚 supporters to talk about overseas property and 鈥榖illions of dollars鈥� in Swiss accounts that would, if brought back, help Pakistan become collectively wealthy.
Instead of offering concrete suggestions for economic policy, Khan continues to rail against the alleged corruption of his opponents and promises prosperity based on 鈥榖ringing back the nation鈥檚 looted wealth鈥�.
But this narrative ignores the economic explanations for flight of capital or why corruption in Pakistan does not result in local capital formation as it does in countries like South Korea or China. Corruption is indeed endemic in Pakistan but it is not the only explanation for Pakistan鈥檚 economic problems.
Khan will keep his base happy with such nationalist rhetoric, while ignoring questions such as why the per hectare yield of its major crops is almost half of most other countries, why Pakistanis consume 34 per cent less calories on average than the rest of the world, or why the value of Pakistan鈥檚 cotton textiles exports is less than that of Bangladesh while Pakistan is the world鈥檚 fourth largest cotton producer and Bangladesh produces negligible amount of cotton.
Fulmination against corruption has become the economic equivalent of conspiracy theories explaining the country鈥檚 insecurity. In popular sentiment, just as conspiracies have made Pakistan weak and vulnerable, its destined economic greatness has been thwarted by corruption, not poor policy choices.
But a nation鈥檚 performance depends on sensible policies, not rhetoric and God鈥檚 special endowments. Even after Khan has improved garbage collection and put all his 鈥榗orrupt鈥� opponents on trial, Pakistan鈥檚 debts won鈥檛 see a drop and exports and remittances will continue to fall short.
Unless, of course, core problems discouraging investment, productivity and exports are addressed. These include religious militancy and poor relations with neighbours, which have economic consequences that Khan鈥檚 base simply does not wish to acknowledge.
On the domestic front too, Khan cannot rely on his base alone. As US political analyst, Charlie Cook, recently observed, 鈥淧olitics is supposed to be an exercise in addition, not subtraction or division.鈥�
With a razor-thin parliamentary (176 out of 342), Khan will soon have to reach out for support beyond his base, which might entail deals and reconciliation that he has always decried. The deal-making began even to reach that slim majority.
Pakistan鈥檚 military leadership and the judiciary have their own crisis of credibility to deal with. Having put their weight behind Khan鈥檚 election success, they cannot afford to be seen as extensions of just one political party forever.
As permanent institutions of state, the judiciary and military need to regain the respect (or at least regard) of other political groups and factions and would soon have to reach out to critics to restore political balance.
Khan鈥檚 celebrity status might not prove enough to deal with Pakistan鈥檚 myriad challenges.